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OPENING THE SAFETY VALVE: A SECOND
LOOK AT COMPASSIONATE RELEASE UNDER
THE FIRST STEP ACT
Michael T. Hamilton*
Under federal law, judges are generally prohibited from changing a
sentence once it has been imposed. Compassionate release, to put it simply,
provides a “safety valve” against this general principle, allowing federal
judges to reduce a prisoner’s sentence when it is warranted by
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” For the past thirty years, statutory
and bureaucratic roadblocks made compassionate release an unlikely
avenue for prisoners to receive sentence reductions. With the passage of the
First Step Act of 2018, the U.S. Congress made the first significant changes
to the compassionate release statute in decades, permitting defendants for
the first time to bring such motions directly to their sentencing courts. An
overwhelming majority of circuit courts have concluded that the First Step
Act’s changes to the compassionate release statute mean that district judges
are not free to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason that a
defendant might raise. Nevertheless, appellate courts remain divided over
what exactly constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for a
sentence reduction.
This Note examines the historical development of, and rationales for,
compassionate release and the reasons why appellate courts have struggled
to define and apply the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard
consistently. After recognizing that Congress’s goals in creating the
compassionate release mechanism were to promote consistency while
keeping the sentencing power in the judiciary, this Note proposes a two-part
solution to balance these goals. This Note’s proposed framework ensures
that judicial discretion continues to serve a critical role in compassionate
release decisions and seeks to resolve the current disagreements among
appellate courts.

* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2016, The College of
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly two decades ago, Thomas McCoy participated in a series of armed
robberies.1 Even though McCoy was just nineteen years old at the time of
the robberies, with only one prior conviction for reckless driving, the court
had no choice but to sentence him to more than thirty-five years in prison.2
The vast majority of that sentence—thirty-two years—resulted from one of
the harshest mandatory sentencing laws the federal system had to offer: the
twenty-five-year mandatory and consecutive sentence for “second or
subsequent” firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).3 At McCoy’s
sentencing, the court expressed concern about the length and fairness of the
sentence it was about to impose: “Congress has decided what the punishment
is. They don’t know you. They don’t see you. All they know is probably
everyone who commits the crime probably ought to get the max, in their
view, so they don’t know what the Court sees here.”4
In 2020, after serving over seventeen years of his sentence, McCoy
petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for
compassionate release, a reduction in sentence available to prisoners
presenting “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances.5 McCoy argued
that had he been sentenced under the current sentencing regime, he would
have received a much more lenient sentence.6 The district court judge
agreed, finding that the “incredible length” of McCoy’s sentence and the
“disparity between his sentence and those sentenced for similar crimes
[today]” amounted to extraordinary and compelling reasons for
compassionate release.7 Accordingly, the court granted McCoy’s motion and
reduced his sentence to time served.8 The U.S. Attorney’s Office appealed,
1. See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2020).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 275. Section 924(c) mandates consecutive minimum sentences for using or
possessing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence: a five- to ten-year mandatory
minimum, depending on the circumstance, for a defendant’s first conviction and a consecutive
twenty-five-year mandatory minimum for a subsequent conviction. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)). Until 2018, a § 924(c) conviction was treated as “second or subsequent” even if, as
in McCoy’s case, it was obtained in the same proceeding as the first. Id. The practice of
charging multiple § 924(c) counts in a single case became known as “stacking.” See id.; see
also John Gleeson, Debevoise’s Holloway Project and “Second Looks”: How Challenging
One Discrete Racial Inequity in Federal Criminal Justice Can Help Produce Systemic
Change, 33 FED. SENT’G REP. 319, 320–21 (2021) (describing how § 924(c) “stacking” often
resulted in defendants receiving “draconian” sentences).
4. McCoy v. United States, No. 03-cr-197, 2020 WL 2738225, at *5 (E.D. Va. May 26,
2020) (quoting Transcript of Proceedings at 19, United States v. McCoy, No. 03cr197-006
(E.D. Va. July 12, 2004), ECF No. 193), aff’d, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020).
5. See id. at *1–2.
6. See id. at *5–6. In 2018, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and discontinued the
practice of “stacking” multiple § 924(c) convictions. Id. at *2. As a result, if McCoy were
sentenced today, he would likely be subjected to less than half the mandatory sentence he
received in 2004. Id. at *6.
7. Id. at *5–6. The court additionally noted that McCoy was a teenager with no relevant
criminal history at the time of the offenses and that he had made efforts to rehabilitate himself
in prison. Id. at *6.
8. Id. at *6.
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but the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.9 After spending
almost two decades behind bars, Thomas McCoy was free.10
However, not all inmates in McCoy’s position have been so fortunate.
Jason Jarvis was serving a forty-year sentence as a result of multiple
“stacked” § 924(c) convictions when he petitioned the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio for compassionate release in 2020.11 Like
McCoy, Jarvis argued that, had he been sentenced for the same offense today,
his sentence would have been several decades shorter.12 The judge deciding
Jarvis’s motion, however, was not persuaded and denied his motion.13 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial, holding that such
sentencing disparities cannot, either alone or in combination with other
extraordinary and compelling factors, serve as a basis for compassionate
release. 14 The incongruity of McCoy’s and Jarvis’s cases illustrates the
fundamental disagreements surrounding compassionate release that have
quietly developed in the lower courts over the past two and a half years.15
Compassionate release is a “safety valve”16 that allows for the release of
federal prisoners in extraordinary and compelling circumstances.17
Following the “truth in sentencing” movement of the 1980s, the federal
prison system grew at a breakneck speed.18 Despite the skyrocketing prison
population, compassionate release was an exceedingly unlikely avenue for

9. See McCoy v. United States, 981 F.3d 271, 288 (4th Cir. 2020).
10. See id.
11. See United States v. Jarvis, No. 94-CR-68, 2020 WL 4726455, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
14, 2020), aff’d, 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, No. 21-568, 2022 WL 89314 (U.S.
Jan. 10, 2022) (mem.).
12. See id. at *3–4.
13. See id.
14. See United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied,
No. 21-568, 2022 WL 89314 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022) (mem.).
15. See infra Parts II.B–C.
16. See Mary Price, The Other Safety Valve: Sentence Reduction Motions Under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 188, 188 (2000).
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (providing that courts may reduce the term of
imprisonment for defendants presenting extraordinary and compelling circumstances or for
certain elderly defendants). The statute does not use the phrase “compassionate release.” See
id. § 3582(c). Instead, the statutory title is “Modification of an Imposed Term of
Imprisonment.” Id. The commonly used term “compassionate release” is thus technically a
“misnomer.” United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020). Other common
terms for this mechanism include “reduction in sentence” and “sentence reduction.” See FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., COMPASSIONATE RELEASE/REDUCTION IN
SENTENCE: PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582 AND 4205(G), at 1–2
(2019), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5050_050_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFH8JYH5]. This Note uses these terms interchangeably.
18. See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 698 (2010) (examining how
various changes in federal criminal sentencing over the past several decades have led to the
rapid growth of the federal prison population); Miles Pope, What We Have Wrought:
Compassionate Release in the Time of Our Plague, ADVOC., Feb. 2021, at 20, 20–21
(attributing the rapid growth in the federal prison population since the 1980s to determinate
sentencing, mandatory sentencing ranges, and the elimination of federal parole).
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prisoners to successfully seek sentence reductions until recently.19 For over
three decades, only one avenue existed by which an inmate could obtain
compassionate release: the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had to file the
motion on the inmate’s behalf.20 The BOP used that power so sparingly that
a 2013 report by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) found that an average of only twenty-four prisoners were
released on BOP motion each year.21
Congress appeared to recognize these concerns when it passed the First
Step Act of 201822 (FSA). The FSA drastically expanded inmates’ abilities
to seek compassionate release by allowing inmates to file compassionate
release motions on their own.23 As the COVID-19 pandemic swept through
the country’s prisons, tens of thousands of federal prisoners applied for
compassionate release.24 Despite the recent passage of the FSA, however,
the vast majority of the motions were denied, and the criminal justice system
has struggled to reach a consensus on how these motions should be
resolved.25 According to one report, 3221 prisoners have been granted
compassionate release since the start of the pandemic—but 99 percent of
those releases were granted by judges over the BOP’s objections.26 In some
cases, prisoners seeking compassionate release died before a judge could rule
on their motion.27
The compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), does not
define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” but instructs judges to
consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as well as
policy statements published by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.28
However, because the Sentencing Commission has lacked a quorum since
early 2019, it has been unable to update its policy statement to reflect the

19. See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 233 (describing the procedural and substantive changes to
the compassionate release process resulting from the FSA).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2012) (amended 2018).
21. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS’ COMPASSIONATE RELEASE PROGRAM 1 (2013), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2013/
e1306.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN46-8M8C].
22. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, and 34 U.S.C.); see also Brooker, 976 F.3d at 233 (describing how the FSA altered the
compassionate release process by removing the Bureau of Prisons as “the sole arbiter of
compassionate release motions”).
23. See First Step Act § 603(b) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).
24. See Keri Blakinger & Joseph Neff, 31,000 Prisoners Sought Compassionate Release
During COVID-19.
The Bureau of Prisons Approved 36., MARSHALL PROJECT
(June 11, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/06/11/31-000-prisonerssought-compassionate-release-during-covid-19-the-bureau-of-prisons-approved-36
[https://perma.cc/2YN7-5JQX].
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring courts evaluating compassionate release
motions to consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and providing that
any sentence reduction be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission”).
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FSA’s changes to the compassionate release statute.29 As a result, federal
judges have been largely left to determine the meaning of “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” on their own.30
The FSA’s amendments to the compassionate release statute have created
questions in the federal courts. As a threshold matter, district courts were
initially divided on whether judges considering defendant-filed
compassionate release motions remained bound by the Sentencing
Commission’s pre-FSA guidelines, limiting the circumstances for which
federal prisoners can receive a sentence reduction to a few narrow
circumstances.31 But, over the past year and a half, an overwhelming
majority of circuits have construed post-FSA judicial discretion broadly,
concluding that judges are free to define “extraordinary and compelling” on
their own initiative.32
But even where district judges now wield broad discretion in defining
“extraordinary and compelling” circumstances, appellate courts have failed
to reach a consensus on just how far a judge may go in making such a
determination.33
Many circuits have been receptive to granting
compassionate release in cases where a defendant is elderly, suffers from a
severe medical condition, or faces a heightened risk of contracting
COVID-19.34 But as the cases of Thomas McCoy and Jason Jarvis illustrate,
appellate courts are divided over what other circumstances can rise to the
level of “extraordinary and compelling.”35 These courts are applying the
29. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2020). Currently, six of
the seven voting-member seats are vacant. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Organization,
https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/organization [https://perma.cc/BE3X-LKPD] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2022). The votes of at least four members are required for the Sentencing
Commission to promulgate amendments to the guidelines. Id.
30. See Casey Tolan, Compassionate Release Became a Life-Or-Death Lottery for
Thousands of Federal Inmates During the Pandemic, CNN (Sept. 30, 2021, 7:05 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/30/us/covid-prison-inmates-compassionate-releaseinvs/index.html [https://perma.cc/55CG-VBL7] (analyzing compassionate release data from
the U.S. Sentencing Commission and finding that the percentage of motions granted in 2020
and 2021 varied dramatically among federal courts across the country).
31. Compare United States v. Young, 458 F. Supp. 3d 838, 845 (M.D. Tenn. 2020)
(concluding that the FSA freed district courts to exercise their discretion in determining what
are extraordinary and compelling circumstances and collecting similar cases), with United
States v. Fox, No. 14-cr-03, 2019 WL 3046086, at *2 (D. Me. July 11, 2019) (collecting cases
holding that district courts considering defendant-initiated compassionate release motions
remain bound by the Sentencing Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement). See generally
John F. Ferraro, Note, Compelling Compassion: Navigating Federal Compassionate Release
After the First Step Act, 62 B.C. L. REV. 2463 (2021) (examining this divide); Marielle Paloma
Greenblatt, Note, In Search of Judicial Compassion: The Cantu-Lynn Divide over
Compassionate Release for Federal Prisoners, 52 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 140 (2020)
(examining this divide).
32. See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Parts II.B–C.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Adamson, 831 F. App’x 82, 83 (4th Cir. 2020).
35. Compare United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 285 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that
district courts may grant compassionate release based on “the severity of a § 924(c) sentence,
combined with the enormous disparity between that sentence and the sentence a defendant
would receive today”), with United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding
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same “extraordinary and compelling” standard but at times reaching
diametrically opposed conclusions.36 Wide disparities in decisions across
the United States suggest that a defendant’s success on a compassionate
release motion depends almost as much on the court hearing the motion as it
does on the facts of the case.37
This Note examines the newfound discretion district court judges have in
defining “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release
in the wake of the FSA. Part I provides a brief history of the federal
compassionate release statute and an overview of how it operates. Part II
examines how federal courts have interpreted the FSA’s changes to
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and why circuit courts have at times struggled to reach a
consensus over what may or may not qualify as extraordinary and compelling
reasons for sentence reduction. Finally, Part III argues that appellate courts
should avoid limiting the discretion of district court judges in determining
the circumstances that justify compassionate release and offers specific
recommendations for the Sentencing Commission in promulgating future
guidance on compassionate release.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
Compassionate release, expanded by Congress in the landmark First Step
Act of 2018, has operated as a safety valve for the federal prison system
during the COVID-19 pandemic, with more than 3600 prisoners being
released in 2020 and in the first half of 2021.38 Yet, the FSA has also
afforded judges broad discretion to determine which sentences should be
reduced, resulting in a nationwide patchwork of compassionate release
outcomes among federal courts.39
To contextualize how the FSA altered the compassionate release system,
this part briefly outlines the history of federal sentencing. Part I.A provides
an overview of the early history of federal sentencing and the historic federal
parole system. Part I.B examines the origins of the current compassionate
release statute and describes how it operates. Finally, Part I.C outlines how
the FSA altered the compassionate release framework by eliminating the
that “[t]he text of the[] sentencing statutes does not permit us to treat the First Step Act’s
non-retroactive amendments, whether by themselves or together with other factors, as
‘extraordinary and compelling’ explanations for a sentencing reduction”), cert. denied,
No. 21-568, 2022 WL 89314 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022) (mem.).
36. See Jarvis, 999 F.3d at 444 (acknowledging that circuit courts are divided over
whether nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws can constitute extraordinary and
compelling reasons for compassionate release).
37. See Tolan, supra note 30 (describing how the percentage of compassionate release
motions granted between January 2020 and June 2021 varied dramatically among federal
district courts).
38. Id.; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION COMPASSIONATE
RELEASE DATA REPORT:
CALENDAR YEARS 2020 TO 2021, at 4 tbl.1 (2021),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencingstatistics/compassionate-release/20210928-Compassionate-Release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SXW-XCLL].
39. See Tolan, supra note 30.
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BOP’s gatekeeping role and expanding judicial discretion in granting
compassionate relief.
A. Early History and Federal Parole
For most of the twentieth century, the federal criminal justice system left
imprisonment decisions to trial judges and parole boards.40 District court
judges had nearly unbridled discretion in sentencing, bound only by statutory
minimums or maximums.41 This indeterminate sentencing scheme was
essentially one of individualized sentencing.42 In theory, judges would
consider the nature of the offense and the individual characteristics of the
offender in relation to the purposes of criminal punishment—specific and
general deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation—and
impose a sentence no greater than necessary to serve those purposes.43 In
practice, however, the sentences they imposed were often inconsistent in
severity: some judges imposed harsh sentences while others imposed lenient
ones.44 There was no common judicial view on how long, if at all, a prison
sentence should be in a given situation to achieve the ends of the criminal
justice system.45 Parole boards also had discretion to release prisoners after
they had served as little as one-third of their sentences, often obscuring at
sentencing the actual amount of time the defendants would serve.46 This
system spawned drastic disparities and uncertainty in sentencing, which
prompted Congress to pass the Sentencing Reform Act of 198447 (SRA).48
B. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
The Sentencing Reform Act sought to bring uniformity and certainty to
federal sentencing.49 To achieve uniformity, it created the U.S. Sentencing
40. See Paul Larkin, Jr., The Future of Presidential Clemency Decision-Making, 16 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 399, 410 (2020). See generally Robert Howell, Comment, Sentencing Reform
Lessons: From the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to the Feeney Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1069 (2004) (describing the historical development of the indeterminate
sentencing structure).
41. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (“[O]nce it is
determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is
imposed, appellate review is at an end.”).
42. See Bruce Green, Thinking About White-Collar Crime and Punishment, CRIM. JUST.
Fall 2020, at 1, 1.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.) (describing the problems
associated with the federal parole system), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021) (mem.); cf.
Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 248 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting how the
system often involved “a parole commission and a judge trying to second-guess each other
about the time an offender will actually serve in prison”).
47. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2040 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
48. See Gertner, supra note 18, at 698.
49. See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and
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Commission50 and delegated to it the power to create a comprehensive
system of sentencing guidelines.51 To achieve certainty, the SRA effectively
abolished the federal parole system and generally prohibited courts from
modifying a term of imprisonment once it had been imposed.52 The SRA’s
determinate sentencing scheme was designed to regulate the front end of the
correctional process.53 The SRA’s determinate sentencing and mandatory
guidelines “amounted to a massive transfer of power away from
dispassionate actors in the criminal justice system (judges and, in theory, the
parole commission) to prosecutors.”54
Having eliminated parole as a “second look” at lengthy sentences,
Congress recognized the need for an alternative and carved out a “safety
valve”55 colloquially known as compassionate release: federal courts could
reduce a sentence when “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranted
release. 56 The SRA thus replaced the U.S. Parole Commission’s “opaque
review of every federal sentence with a much narrower judicial review of
cases presenting ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for relief.”57 By
lodging the authority to review and reduce sentences in federal district courts,
Congress intended to “keep[] the sentencing power in the judiciary where it
belongs.”58
In crafting § 3582(c)(1)(A), Congress divided compassionate release
responsibility among three actors.59 First, the Sentencing Commission was
tasked with describing what qualified as extraordinary and compelling
reasons for release by issuing general policy statements.60 Second, the BOP
would identify prisoners who met the criteria and bring their cases to the

Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 188–90 (1993) (describing the
purpose, history, and various components of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). The Sentencing Commission is an independent commission
located within the judicial branch of the federal government consisting of seven voting
members appointed by the president of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
Id.
51. See id. § 994.
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010); Hatch,
supra note 49, at 189 (describing the abolishment of federal parole under the SRA).
53. See Larkin, supra note 40, at 411.
54. Pope, supra note 18, at 21; see also John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply
Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2013) (“At least since
1994, it appears that almost all the growth in prison populations has come from prosecutors’
decisions to file felony charges.”).
55. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 121 (1983).
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Thacker v. United States, No. 21-877, 2021 WL
5930591 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2021).
58. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 121 (1983).
59. See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, COMPASSIONATE RELEASE AND THE
FIRST STEP ACT: THEN AND NOW 1, https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/CompassionateRelease-in-the-First-Step-Act-Explained-FAMM.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6SS-XRAD].
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (instructing the Sentencing Commission to promulgate general
policy statements “describ[ing] what should be considered extraordinary and compelling
reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific
examples”).
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courts’ attention by filing a motion for a reduction in sentence.61 Finally, the
sentencing court would decide whether to reduce the sentence after finding
that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction and after
considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.62 But the BOP and the
Sentencing Commission usurped the process, circumscribing the courts’
abilities to reduce sentences under § 3582(c)(1)(A).63 As a result,
compassionate release under the SRA was widely regarded as both
underutilized and dysfunctional.64
In enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress never defined
or provided examples of “extraordinary and compelling” and, instead,
delegated that task to the Sentencing Commission.65 Despite this command,
it took the Sentencing Commission over twenty years to publish a substantive
description of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”66 When the
Sentencing Commission finally acted in 2007, it promulgated U.S.
Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13 (“U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13”), a policy statement
advising that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a sentence
reduction could include terminal illness, serious medical conditions,
advanced age, and family circumstances.67 The 2007 policy statement also
introduced what has now become known as the catchall provision, permitting
compassionate release for any “other” reasons as determined by the BOP
director.68
But the Sentencing Commission’s twenty-year delay mattered little.
Although the Sentencing Commission was tasked with defining the
“extraordinary and compelling” standard, its role was largely constrained by
the BOP’s “absolute gatekeeping authority.”69 For over thirty years, the BOP
maintained exclusive power over all avenues of compassionate release, as
any motion for compassionate release had to be made by the BOP director.70
The BOP used this gatekeeping power sparingly, seldom bringing such
motions to the courts.71
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (providing that courts may reduce a term of
imprisonment “upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons”).
62. See id.
63. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 231–33 (2d Cir. 2020).
64. See, e.g., id. (describing the BOP’s mismanagement of the compassionate release
process prior to the FSA); Shon Hopwood, Second Looks and Second Chances, 41 CARDOZO
L. REV. 83, 101–06 (2019) (examining the flaws of compassionate release under the SRA).
65. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Congress’s only other guidance was that
“[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and
compelling reason.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
66. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2007).
67. See id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(i)–(iii).
68. See id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(iv) (stating that compassionate release is warranted if,
“[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case
an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons
described in [the other parts of the policy statement]”); Brooker, 976 F.3d at 232.
69. Brooker, 976 F.3d at 232.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2012) (amended 2018).
71. See Christie Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying, but Their Only Way Out of Prison Is a
Coffin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/prisonscompassionate-release-.html [https://perma.cc/NQ8Y-YUE6].
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A 2013 report from the OIG painted a bleak picture.72 The OIG report
found that the BOP rarely brought compassionate release motions to the
courts, even when defendants had satisfied the Sentencing Commission’s
objective criteria for a sentence reduction.73 In concluding that the BOP
failed to properly manage the compassionate release program, the report
found that BOP’s “implementation of the program [was] inconsistent and
result[ed] in ad hoc decision making,” with “no timeliness standards for
reviewing . . . requests.”74 From 2006 to 2011, an average of just
twenty-four defendants were granted compassionate release each year.75
These failures had tragic consequences: of the 208 people whose release
requests were approved by both a warden and a BOP regional director, 13
percent died awaiting a final decision by the BOP director.76 Moreover, the
OIG report found that the BOP did not approve a single nonmedical
compassionate release request during this period.77
In 2016, responding to widespread criticism of the compassionate release
system, the Sentencing Commission conducted an in-depth review, held a
public hearing, and revised its policy statement.78 It also expanded,
reorganized, and clarified the four categories of extraordinary and
compelling reasons.79 The Sentencing Commission even made a plea to the
BOP to file such motions whenever prisoners were found to meet the
criteria.80 Despite the Sentencing Commission’s efforts, however, the BOP
continued to grant exceedingly few compassionate release motions.81 The
BOP rarely filed such motions and few prisoners received compassionate
release, effectively eliminating any meaningful post-sentencing safety
valve.82 Indeed, one federal judge who has been on the bench for twenty-two
years stated that she had never received such a motion from the BOP.83

72. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 21.
73. See id. at 11.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1.
76. See id. at 11.
77. See id. at 20.
78. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, supp., amend. 799, at 135 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2016).
79. See id. at 135–36.
80. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016)
(“The Commission encourages the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to file such a motion if
the defendant meets any of the circumstances set forth in Application Note 1.”).
81. Between 2013 and 2017, the BOP granted only 6 percent of all compassionate release
requests. See Thompson, supra note 71. In 2018, only twenty-four individuals were released
under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: ONE YEAR
OF IMPLEMENTATION 47 & 66 n.143 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-publications/2020/20200831_First-Step-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3NEL-AR3H].
82. See Thompson, supra note 71.
83. See Colleen McMahon, (Re)views from the Bench: A Judicial Perspective on
Second-Look Sentencing in the Federal System, 58 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1617, 1618 (2021).
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C. The First Step Act of 2018
Against this grim backdrop, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018.84
The FSA passed with overwhelming bipartisan support85 and was described
by one of its cosponsors as “the most significant criminal justice reform bill
in a generation.”86 Among other reforms—such as easing mandatory
minimums for certain firearm and drug offenses and requiring inmates to be
housed closer to their families87—the FSA made the first major changes to
the compassionate release statute since it was enacted in 1984.88 Section
603(b) of the FSA, titled “Increasing the Use and Transparency of
Compassionate Release,” amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) by removing the BOP as
the gatekeeper of compassionate release motions and empowering
defendants to file such motions directly with their sentencing judges.89
The FSA was met with widespread approval and optimism. One lawmaker
described the FSA’s changes as both “expand[ing]” and “expedit[ing]”
compassionate release.90 Another representative stated that the FSA was
“improving application of compassionate release.”91 A number of legal
commentators saw the updated compassionate release mechanism as creating
a new avenue for judicial “second looks” at sentences.92 Margaret Love, a
former pardon attorney in the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon
Attorney, described the modified compassionate release mechanism as “the
hidden, magical trapdoor in the First Step Act that has yet to come to
everyone’s attention.”93
In its current form, § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that a court may reduce a
prisoner’s sentence if it finds that the sentence reduction is (1) warranted by
“extraordinary and compelling reasons”; (2) “consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) supported
84. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, and 34 U.S.C.).
85. See Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law—and What
Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 4, 2019), http://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next
[https://perma.cc/NS9A-UX9P] (describing the passage of the FSA).
86. 164 CONG. REC. S7649 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
87. See First Step Act §§ 401, 403, 601; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 81, at
1–2.
88. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–
2040 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
89. First Step Act § 603(b) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) by permitting
defendants to move for compassionate release “after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the
defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of
the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier”).
90. 164 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Ben Cardin).
91. 164 CONG. REC. H10362 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2018) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler).
92. See, e.g., Todd Bussert, What the FIRST STEP Act Means for Federal Prisoners,
CHAMPION, May 2019, at 28, 32; Hopwood, supra note 64, at 106–07; Sarah French Russell,
Second Looks at Sentences Under the First Step Act, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 76, 78 (2019).
93. RJ Vogt, How Courts Could Ease the White House’s Clemency Backlog, LAW360
(Aug. 25, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1191991/how-courts-couldease-the-white-house-s-clemency-backlog [https://perma.cc/568U-4B5X].
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by the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are
applicable.94 At first blush, this framework seems simple enough. But there
was a problem: because the Sentencing Commission has lacked a quorum
since early 2019, it has been unable to update its policy statement to reflect
the FSA’s changes.95 As a result, the policy statement still refers in multiple
places to the BOP having the exclusive authority to bring compassionate
release motions and to determine the circumstances that qualify as
extraordinary and compelling.96 Thus, as the COVID-19 pandemic spread
through the federal prison system and compassionate release petitions piled
up on court dockets, district judges were largely left to decipher the meaning
of “extraordinary and compelling” on their own.97
The first question that district courts grappled with was whether judges
considering defendant-initiated compassionate release requests remained
bound by the Sentencing Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement.98 The
FSA added the procedure for prisoner-initiated motions but left the rest of
the compassionate release statute unchanged.99 Moreover, as noted above,
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) requires that any sentence reduction granted by a court be
“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.”100 Some district courts initially ruled in 2019 and 2020 that
they remained bound by the Sentencing Commission’s outdated policy
statement,101 thereby limiting the permissible reasons for sentence reduction
to those reasons specifically listed in the policy statement.
The Second Circuit was the first appellate court to address this question
directly. In United States v. Brooker,102 the Second Circuit held that the
FSA’s changes to § 3582(c)(1)(A) empower district courts evaluating
motions for compassionate release to consider any extraordinary and
compelling reasons for granting release or a sentence reduction, not just those
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The sentencing factors include (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant; (2) whether the sentence
reflects the severity of the offense, affords adequate deterrence, and promotes respect for the
law; (3) whether the sentence is reasonable given the available sentences; (4) the kind of
sentence and the relevant guidelines; (5) pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission; (6) the “need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities” among similar
defendants; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Id. § 3553(a).
95. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020). The most recent
version of the policy statement was promulgated by the Sentencing Commission in November
2018. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
96. See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234; U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (stating that a court may reduce a defendant’s sentence “[u]pon motion
of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons”); id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D) (providing for
compassionate release based on “other” extraordinary and compelling reasons “[a]s
determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons”); id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.4 (stating that “[a]
reduction under this policy statement may be granted only upon motion by the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons”).
97. See Tolan, supra note 30.
98. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
99. See United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2021).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
101. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
102. 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020).
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criteria set forth in the pre-FSA policy statement.103 The Second Circuit
emphasized that the FSA was intended to expand and expedite
compassionate release by allowing defendants to make motions directly to
the district courts—thus ending the BOP’s role as the “sole arbiter” of such
claims—and by permitting those courts greater discretion in granting
release. 104 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the constraints imposed
by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 do not apply to compassionate release motions brought
to the courts directly by defendants, as opposed to those brought by the
BOP.105 In short, the FSA freed district courts to consider “the full slate of
extraordinary and compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring
before them.”106
An overwhelming majority of circuits have followed the Second Circuit’s
lead, likewise concluding that the Sentencing Commission’s failure to update
its policy means that there is no “applicable” policy statement to apply to
defendant-initiated compassionate release motions under the FSA.107 These
courts point to three key reasons for why the pre-FSA policy statement is no
longer binding on federal courts:
(1) the plain language of
§ 3582(c)(1)(A),108 (2) the text of the Sentencing Commission’s policy
statement,109 and (3) congressional intent.110 To date, only the Eleventh
Circuit has held that the judges reviewing defendant-filed compassionate

103. Id. at 236.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 233, 235–36.
106. Id. at 237.
107. See United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Long,
997 F.3d 342, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2021); United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. McGee, 992
F.3d 1035, 1050 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 282 (4th Cir. 2020);
United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1109 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d
1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020). But see United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247–48 (11th
Cir.) (holding that district courts reviewing defendant-initiated compassionate release motions
remain bound by the Sentencing Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement), cert. denied, 142
S. Ct. 583 (2021) (mem.).
108. The statute requires courts to consider “applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Because the Sentencing Commission
has failed to update its policy statement to reflect the FSA’s amendments, most appellate
courts have concluded it is no longer “applicable.” See, e.g., Brooker, 976 F.3d at 235–36.
109. First, the policy statement begins with the words “[u]pon motion of the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Second, Application Note 4 states that a “reduction under this policy statement may be granted
only upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.4 (emphasis
added). Third, the catchall provision in Application Note 1(D) allows only the “Director of
the Bureau of Prisons” to determine “other” extraordinary and compelling reasons. Id.
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D). Thus, courts have found, the policy statement by its very terms is not
applicable—and not binding—for courts considering prisoner-initiated motions. See, e.g.,
Brooker, 976 F.3d at 235–36; McCoy, 981 F.3d at 282 (“A sentence reduction brought about
by motion of a defendant, rather than the BOP, is not a reduction ‘under this policy
statement.’”).
110. See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 235–36 (describing Congress’s intent to expand and expedite
compassionate release by removing the BOP as the gatekeeper).
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release motions remain bound by the Sentencing Commission’s pre-FSA
policy statement.111
II. DEFINING AND APPLYING THE “EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING”
STANDARD: CONFUSION IN THE CIRCUITS
Part II of this Note examines how appellate courts have struggled to reach
a consensus on what, if any, constraints there are on district court judges’
discretion to determine the types of circumstances that can amount to
extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. Part II.A
analyzes how the majority of circuit courts have defined the “extraordinary
and compelling” standard following the FSA’s amendments to
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Part II.B considers two examples of extraordinary and
compelling circumstances frequently raised by defendants that have sharply
divided appellate courts.
Given that most circuits agree that district court judges have significant
discretion in defining “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances,112 one
might assume that appellate courts have been willing to leave such
determinations squarely in the hands of district court judges. Indeed, in the
two and a half years since the passage of the FSA, district courts across the
United States have granted compassionate release for reasons far beyond
those enumerated in the policy statement.113 Even so, some appellate courts
have emphasized that district court judges’ authority to independently define

111. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248. In Bryant, a divided panel held that the Sentencing
Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement continues to bind judges because “1B1.13 is an
applicable policy statement for all Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motions,” and “Application Note
1(D) does not grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a
reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Id. The court began by citing two dictionary definitions
of “applicable” to conclude that the policy statement is both “capable of being applied” and
“relevant” to all § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions, regardless of who files them. Id. at 1252–54. The
Eleventh Circuit then determined that two contextual factors support the conclusion that
§ 1B1.13 continues to be an “applicable” policy statement. Id. at 1255–56. First, in passing
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress sought to curtail judicial discretion by giving
the Sentencing Commission the authority to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”
Id. at 1255. Second, courts must interpret statutes based on how they would have been
understood at the time they were enacted. Id. Thus, “[a] sentencing court must ask only what
guideline the Commission has tied to the relevant statute; it is prohibited from looking at the
‘circumstances of a particular case’ to determine the ‘applicable guideline.’” Id.
112. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsay, No. 96-cr-1098, 2021 WL 1877963, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2021) (granting compassionate release based on the defendant’s youth at
the time of the offense and his substantial rehabilitation while in prison); United States v.
Hatcher, 18-CR-454-10, 2021 WL 1535310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021) (granting
compassionate release based on the harshness of confinement during the COVID-19
pandemic); United States v. Price, 496 F. Supp. 3d 83, 90 (D.D.C. 2020) (granting
compassionate release based on unwarranted sentencing disparities between codefendants);
McCoy v. United States, No. 03-cr-197, 2020 WL 2738225, at *8 (E.D. Va. May 26, 2020)
(granting compassionate release based on nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws), aff’d,
981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020).
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“extraordinary and compelling” is not boundless.114 Because a grant of
compassionate release is purely discretionary, decisions to grant or deny a
compassionate release motion are reviewed for abuse of discretion.115
Circuit courts therefore retain significant power to determine whether a
district court judge has gone too far in granting or denying compassionate
release.
A. Defining the Standard: Appellate Courts Review Compassionate
Release Decisions for Abuse of Discretion
Because Congress never defined the meaning of “extraordinary and
compelling reasons,” federal courts have largely been left to puzzle out that
standard on their own.116 In doing so, courts have generally considered the
statute’s text, dictionary definitions, and the examples provided in the
Sentencing Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement to form a working
definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”117 For starters,
appellate courts have emphasized that judges interpreting the statute remain
bound by the plain meaning of those words.118 As the Seventh Circuit
explained: “The statute itself sets the standard . . . . [A] judge who strikes
off on a different path risks an appellate holding that judicial discretion has
been abused.”119 Similarly, several circuits have noted that even if it is no
longer binding, the pre-FSA policy statement’s description of “extraordinary
and compelling” circumstances can “guide discretion without being
conclusive.”120
As an initial matter, it is worth highlighting several types of circumstances
that courts generally agree are extraordinary and compelling reasons for
compassionate release. First, appellate courts are in universal agreement that
individuals with circumstances falling within the categories enumerated in
114. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2021) (“The
inapplicability of the policy statement [does] not mean . . . that all of [the defendant’s]
proposed reasons [fall] within the statutory meaning of ‘extraordinary and compelling.’”).
115. See, e.g., id. at 259; United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 280 (4th Cir. 2020).
116. See Tolan, supra note 30.
117. See, e.g., Andrews, 12 F.4th at 260 (noting that courts interpreting “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” may look to the statute’s language, dictionary definitions, and the
existing policy statement to “give shape to the otherwise amorphous phrase”); United States
v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020).
118. See, e.g., Andrews, 12 F.4th at 260; Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180.
119. Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180.
120. Id.; see also Andrews, 12 F.4th at 260; United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802
(9th Cir. 2021) (“The Sentencing Commission’s statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform
a district court’s discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant, but they are not
binding.”); United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 503 n.1 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[B]ecause district
courts are free ‘to define “extraordinary and compelling” on their own initiative,’ they may
look to § 1B1.13 as relevant, even if no longer binding.” (quoting United States v. Elias, 984
F.3d 516, 519–20 (6th Cir. 2021))); McCoy, 981 F.3d at 282 n.7 (stating that the pre-FSA
policy statement “remains helpful guidance even when motions are filed by defendants”). But
see United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2021) (concluding that a district
court “cannot rely on the BOP-specific policy statement when considering a non-BOP § 3582
motion” because doing so would “rely on pieces of text in an otherwise inapplicable policy
statement”).
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the Sentencing Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement continue to be
eligible for compassionate release.121 Thus, prisoners who satisfy U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13’s criteria relating to health, age, or family circumstances remain
unaffected by the FSA’s changes to § 3582(c)(1)(A). 122 The only difference
is that these individuals now have the ability to bring their motions directly
to the courts and need not rely on the BOP bringing a motion on their
behalf.123 Similarly, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, most circuits
have been receptive to granting compassionate release in cases in which an
inmate shows both a particularized susceptibility to the disease and a
particularized risk of contracting the disease at a prison facility.124
There is an inherent tension between affording judges broad discretion and
seeking to promote consistent interpretations of the law and consistent
outcomes. On the one hand, most appellate courts have recognized that
Congress’s purpose in passing the FSA was to expand the use of
compassionate release.125 Similarly, without an “applicable” policy
statement from the Sentencing Commission, most appellate courts agree that
district court judges are free to define “extraordinary and compelling” on
their own initiative.126 This would suggest that judges should have wide
latitude in making compassionate release decisions.
On the other hand, some courts and legal commentators have raised
concerns that too much discretion will give judges unfettered power to invent
their own policies about compassionate release.127 The following sections
illustrate how appellate courts have struggled to draw a clear line between
acceptable exercises of judicial authority and abuse of discretion.
B. Applying the Standard: Nonretroactive Changes to Sentencing Laws
Part II.B of this Note examines two examples of extraordinary and
compelling circumstances that have sharply divided appellate courts. Part
II.B.1 considers sentencing disparities resulting from nonretroactive changes
to sentencing laws. Part II.B.2 evaluates circumstances that existed at the
time a defendant was originally sentenced, namely a defendant’s youth and
sentencing disparities between codefendants.

121. See United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.) (describing how courts
may grant compassionate release for the reasons listed in the pre-FSA policy statement), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021) (mem.).
122. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–(C) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018).
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
124. See, e.g., Elias, 984 F.3d at 520; United States v. Adamson, 831 F. App’x 82, 83 (4th
Cir. 2020).
125. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1257 (contending that broad judicial discretion in
defining “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances “would return us to the pre-SRA
world of disparity and uncertainty”); Larkin, supra note 40, at 416–20 (arguing that the FSA
liberalized compassionate release by providing prisoners an additional method of review, not
by expanding judicial discretion via the catchall provision).
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In the two and a half years since the passage of the FSA, many defendants
have sought compassionate release based on sentencing disparities resulting
from nonretroactive changes to federal sentencing laws.128 These cases
typically involve significant—often decades-long—differences between the
sentence that a particular defendant received under the previous sentencing
regime and the sentence that the same defendant would likely receive for the
same crime today.129 Many defendants have raised these arguments in the
context of the FSA’s nonretroactive changes to firearm and drug
sentences.130 In addition to modifying the compassionate release statute, the
FSA also made changes to two especially harsh provisions of federal
sentencing law. First, as described briefly above, section 403 of the FSA
amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to reduce mandatory consecutive sentences for
multiple firearms convictions, putting an end to the practice of § 924(c)
“stacking.”131 Second, section 401 of the FSA reduced enhanced penalties
imposed on recidivist offenders for certain federal drug offenses under 21
U.S.C. § 851.132 Notably, however, Congress made these amendments
applicable to pending cases without providing for retroactive application.133
As a result, the new sentencing schemes do not apply to defendants who were
initially sentenced before the FSA came into law.134
As an alternative, many defendants have sought to reduce their sentences
via the updated compassionate release statute.135 Appellate courts have
diverged on whether these nonretroactive changes constitute an extraordinary
and compelling reason for sentence reduction.136 Part II.B.1 analyzes the
reasoning circuit courts have relied on to find that nonretroactive changes can
provide sufficient grounds for compassionate release. Part II.B.2 then
discusses the alternative lines of reasoning that appellate courts have
128. See Gleeson, supra note 3, at 322.
129. See id.
130. See id.; Hopwood, supra note 64, at 109–10.
131. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–22
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924); supra notes 3, 6 and accompanying text. Prior to
the FSA, the common practice of “stacking” multiple § 924(c) counts in a single prosecution
could readily escalate to defendants receiving life—or near-life—sentences without parole.
See Gleeson, supra note 3, at 319–20. Even more troubling, the government habitually
deployed the practice in a racially disproportionate fashion against Black men. See id. at 320
& 326 n.14. In passing the FSA, Congress abolished § 924(c) “stacking” by clarifying that
the recidivist provisions for a “second or subsequent” § 924(c) offense applied only “after a
prior conviction under [§ 924(c)] has become final.” See First Step Act § 403(a).
132. See First Step Act § 401; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 81, at 7–9
(describing these changes).
133. See First Step Act § 401(c) (“APPLICABILITY TO PENDING CASES.—This section, and
the amendments made by this section, shall apply to any offense that was committed before
the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such
date of enactment.”); id. § 403(b) (same).
134. Id. §§ 401(c), 403(b).
135. See, e.g., Gleeson, supra note 3, at 322–24 (describing ongoing litigation). The
question of whether sentencing disparities may constitute “extraordinary and compelling”
circumstances has also been raised in cases where defendants seek compassionate release
based on the Supreme Court’s nonretroactive decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005). See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2021).
136. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
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employed to conclude that such changes cannot be considered extraordinary
and compelling.
1. Where Nonretroactive Changes to Sentencing Laws Can Be Grounds for
Compassionate Release
Some appellate courts have found that sentencing disparities resulting
from nonretroactive changes in sentencing laws can, either alone or in
combination with other factors, constitute extraordinary and compelling
grounds for compassionate release.137 At first glance, it is not clear whether
courts should be permitted to grant compassionate release to prisoners
sentenced under laws that Congress has since found too punitive and that
Congress amended but did not make retroactively applicable.138 As legal
scholar Shon Hopwood notes, one could view Congress’s decision not to
make such amendments retroactive in two ways.139 On the one hand,
Congress’s decision to change these laws indicates that Congress viewed
those punishments as too punitive and unfair.140 On the other hand,
Congress’s decision not to make these changes retroactive could be seen as
a deliberate choice to preclude those already sentenced from benefitting from
any type of sentence reduction.141
Yet, Hopwood argues that Congress took a middle ground—opting not to
make defendants sentenced under the earlier sentencing regime categorically
eligible for relief but, instead, allowing these individuals to establish
extraordinary and compelling reasons individually.142 As Hopwood notes,
“[t]hat Congress chose to foreclose one avenue for relief does not mean it
chose to foreclose all means of redressing draconian sentences imposed
under [the earlier regime].”143
At least three courts of appeals have agreed with Hopwood’s reasoning
and concluded that sentencing disparities resulting from these nonretroactive
changes may constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances. In
United States v. McCoy,144 described above, the Fourth Circuit held that the
district court had not abused its discretion by granting compassionate release
to a defendant based largely on the FSA’s nonretroactive changes to § 924(c)
mandatory minimums.145 In affirming the lower court’s decision to reduce
McCoy’s sentence, the Fourth Circuit stated, “We think courts legitimately
may consider, under the ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ inquiry, that
defendants are serving sentences that Congress itself views as dramatically
longer than necessary or fair.”146 The Second Circuit has seemingly
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See infra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
See Hopwood, supra note 64, at 109–10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 285–86.
Id.
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embraced a similar position.147 The Tenth Circuit has opted for a middle
ground, determining that the FSA’s nonretroactive amendments can
constitute sufficient grounds to justify a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) when combined with other extraordinary and compelling
reasons.148
2. Where Nonretroactive Changes to Sentencing Laws Cannot Be Grounds
for Compassionate Release
Other appellate courts have reached the opposite conclusion. The Third
and Seventh Circuits, for example, have expressly prohibited district courts
from relying on nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws as a basis for
granting a sentence reduction.149 This is also the case in the Eleventh Circuit
where, as described above, district courts remain bound by the Sentencing
Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement.150 The typical refrain from courts
adopting this view is that allowing defendants to seek compassionate release
under the updated version of § 3582(c)(1)(A) would contravene Congress’s
deliberate choice to make sections 401 and 403 of the FSA prospective
only.151 Under the nonretroactivity doctrine, the “ordinary practice” in
federal sentencing is to apply new penalties to defendants that have not yet
been sentenced, while withholding those changes from defendants already
sentenced.152 Thus, “[w]hat the Supreme Court views as the ‘ordinary
practice’ cannot also be an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason to deviate
from that practice.”153
In United States v. Thacker,154 the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that,
until the Sentencing Commission updates its policy statement to reflect the
FSA’s changes, district court judges have broad discretion to determine what
else may constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a

147. See United States v. Rose, 837 F. App’x 72, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2021) (stating that a court
evaluating a compassionate release motion “may look to, but is not bound by, the mandatory
minimums that the defendant would face if being sentenced for the first time under revised
guidelines or statutes”).
148. See United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1048 (10th Cir. 2021).
149. See United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that the
nonretroactive changes to the § 924(c) mandatory minimums “cannot be a basis for
compassionate release” because “Congress specifically decided that the changes to the
§ 924(c) mandatory minimums would not apply to people who had already been sentenced”);
United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2021) (reaching the same conclusion).
150. See United States v. Jackson, No. 20-14840, 2021 WL 3522399, at *2 (11th Cir.
Aug. 11, 2021) (“Bryant forecloses [the] argument that the sentencing disparity caused by the
amendment to § 924(c)’s stacking provision . . . constitute[s] [an] extraordinary and
compelling reason[] to warrant a sentence reduction.”).
151. See, e.g., Thacker, 4 F.4th at 573 (noting that because Congress chose to make other
provisions of the FSA categorically retroactive, there is no way to read Congress’s choice to
limit the scope of sections 401 and 403 as “anything other than deliberate”).
152. See United States v. Wills, 997 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Dorsey v. United
States, 567 U.S. 260, 280 (2012)).
153. Id.
154. 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021).
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sentence reduction.155 Yet, the court went on to explain that “the
discretionary authority conferred by § 3582(c)(1)(A) only goes so far.”156 It
cannot be used to effect a sentence reduction at odds with Congress’s express
determination that the FSA’s mandatory minimum amendments would apply
only prospectively.157 In other words, “there is nothing ‘extraordinary’ about
leaving untouched the exact penalties that Congress prescribed and that a
district court imposed for particular violations of a statute.”158
A string of recent Sixth Circuit decisions illustrates the difficulties some
appellate courts have had in defining the “extraordinary and compelling”
standard in the context of nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws. Over
the past year, the Sixth Circuit has published no fewer than six separate
opinions addressing the question but has thus far been unable to reach a
consensus.159 These decisions illustrate that these disagreements exist not
only between the various courts of appeals but also within them.
The story began in March 2021, when two separate Sixth Circuit panels
considered for the first time whether the FSA’s nonretroactive changes to
mandatory minimum laws can constitute an extraordinary and compelling
reason for release.160 In United States v. Tomes,161 defendant Tomes argued
that his chronic asthma, which placed him at increased risk of serious
complications from COVID-19, coupled with the disparity between his
sentence and the sentence he might have received under the FSA, were
extraordinary and compelling reasons sufficient to warrant compassionate
release. 162 The panel dismissed Tomes’s chronic asthma complaint as
“unpersuasive” because he failed to provide adequate records to support his
diagnosis or demonstrate that the BOP was unable to control COVID-19
outbreaks in his facility.163 Then, offering “[o]ne last point,” the panel
rejected Tomes’s argument that section 401 of the FSA warranted his
compassionate release,164 concluding that it “[would] not render § 401(c)
useless by using § 3582(c)(1)(A) as an end run around Congress’s careful
effort to limit the retroactivity of the First Step Act’s reforms.”165 That same
155. Id. at 573.
156. Id. at 574.
157. Id.
158. Id.; see also United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Why would
the same Congress that specifically decided to make these sentencing reductions
non-retroactive in 2018 somehow mean to use a general sentencing statute from 1984 to
unscramble that approach?”), cert. denied, No. 21-568, 2022 WL 89314 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022)
(mem.).
159. See United States v. McCall, No. 21-3400, 2021 WL 5984403 (6th Cir. Dec. 17,
2021); United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021); Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442; United
States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500 (6th Cir.
2021); United States v. Wills, 991 F.3d 720 (6th Cir.), amended and superseded by 997 F.3d
685 (6th Cir. 2021).
160. See Tomes, 990 F.3d 500; Wills, 991 F.3d 720.
161. 990 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2021).
162. Id. at 501.
163. Id. at 504–05.
164. Id. at 505.
165. Id.
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day, another Sixth Circuit panel reached the same conclusion in United
States v. Wills.166
Two months later, the Sixth Circuit changed course. In United States v.
Owens,167 a third Sixth Circuit panel affirmed a sentence reduction that was
based in part on section 403 of the FSA.168 The panel distinguished Owens
from Tomes and Wills on the grounds that those decisions held only that a
defendant may not rely on a nonretroactive amendment alone when trying to
establish extraordinary and compelling reasons.169 The Owens panel thus
concluded that “in making an individualized determination about whether
extraordinary and compelling reasons merit compassionate release, a district
court may include, along with other factors, the disparity between a
defendant’s actual sentence and the sentence that he would receive if the First
Step Act applied.”170 For the time being, it appeared that the Sixth Circuit
had taken the middle path adopted by the Tenth Circuit.171
Less than a month after Owens, however, the Sixth Circuit reversed course
again.172 In United States v. Jarvis,173 a divided Sixth Circuit panel expressly
rejected Owens and held that district courts cannot treat the FSA’s
nonretroactive amendments, whether alone or in combination with other
factors, as extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.174 The Jarvis
majority acknowledged that its decision was in direct conflict with Owens
but concluded that it was bound by the Sixth Circuit’s earlier decision in
Tomes.175 “Forced to choose between conflicting precedents,” the Jarvis
majority stated, “we must follow the first one, Tomes.”176 Another Sixth
Circuit panel followed suit in United States v. Hunter,177 described further
below, likewise holding that the nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws
can never serve as a basis for compassionate release.178

166. 991 F.3d 720, 722–24 (6th Cir.), amended and superseded by 997 F.3d 685 (6th Cir.
2021).
167. 996 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2021).
168. See id. at 763.
169. The Owens panel emphasized that while Tomes and Wills had sought compassionate
release based solely on the FSA’s amendments, Owens had pointed to additional factors
meriting compassionate release, namely the fact that his lengthy sentence resulted from
exercising his right to a trial and his rehabilitative efforts while in prison. Id. at 760–61.
170. Id. at 763.
171. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
172. See United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, No.
21-568, 2022 WL 89314 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022) (mem.).
173. 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, No. 21-568, 2022 WL 89314 (U.S. Jan. 10,
2022) (mem.).
174. See id. at 445 (“The text of these sentencing statutes does not permit us to treat the
First Step Act’s non-retroactive amendments, whether by themselves or together with other
factors, as ‘extraordinary and compelling’ explanations for a sentencing reduction.”).
175. See id. at 445.
176. Id. at 445–46.
177. 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021).
178. See id. at 563 (holding that “[t]he district court erred when it considered Booker’s
non-retroactive change in sentencing law as a factor to support an ‘extraordinary and
compelling’ reason for Hunter’s release”).
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But the Sixth Circuit wasn’t finished. In December 2021, the court
changed course yet again. Opting to embrace Owens over Jarvis, another
divided panel in United States v. McCall179 held that district courts in fact
can consider nonretroactive changes in the law as one of several factors
forming extraordinary and compelling circumstances.180 In doing so, the
panel determined cases holding otherwise had improperly ignored the
circuit’s ruling in Owens and thus were not binding.181 In his dissent, Judge
Raymond M. Kethledge stated that “[f]or the district courts in this circuit, our
decision in this case renders the law on the issue presented unknowable.”182
C. Applying the Standard: Youth, Codefendant Sentencing Disparities,
and Other Circumstances at the Time of Sentencing
Like nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws, considerable
disagreement also exists among circuit courts over whether circumstances
that existed when a defendant was initially sentenced may qualify as
extraordinary and compelling.183 Compassionate release motions based on
these types of circumstances raise somewhat different questions than those
discussed in the previous section. While motions for compassionate release
based on nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws generally concern
circumstances that did not arise until after sentencing (and thus could not
have been considered by the sentencing judge), the types of compassionate
release motions analyzed in this section concern facts that existed at the time
of sentencing and that were (or could have been) considered by the
sentencing judge.184
Notably, nothing in § 3582(c)(1)(A) prohibits a court from considering
factors that existed at sentencing when deciding whether to grant
compassionate release.185 But such motions also raise unique concerns.
Defendants who base their § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions on factors that existed at
the time they were sentenced are essentially asking for a “do-over”—that is,
they are asking the judge considering the compassionate release motion to
179. No. 21-3400, 2021 WL 5984403 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021).
180. Id. at *6 (“Under our precedents, a court may consider a nonretroactive change in the
law as one of several factors forming extraordinary and compelling circumstances qualifying
for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).”).
181. See id. at *5 (“Owens was the first in-circuit case to address the issue of a
nonretroactive sentence as one of several factors creating an extraordinary and compelling
reason for compassionate release. Jarvis, by contravening Owens, created an intra-circuit
split. Because Owens was published before Jarvis, Owens ‘remains controlling authority’ that
binds future panels.”).
182. Id. at *6 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
183. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
184. See United States v. Logan, 532 F. Supp. 3d 725, 731–35 (D. Minn. 2021) (describing
the differences between these types of compassionate release motions).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Similarly, Application Note 2 to the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statement states that “an extraordinary and compelling reason need not
have been unforeseen at the time of sentencing” and that a sentencing court’s earlier
knowledge or anticipation of the asserted reason “does not preclude consideration for a
reduction under this policy statement.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13, cmt. n.2
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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“reweigh the law and facts that were before the sentencing judge at the time
of sentencing.”186 Accordingly, courts may be reluctant to give such factors
much weight when deciding whether to grant compassionate release,
especially when a different judge imposed the original sentence.187
Countless circumstances may fall into this bucket, and this Note examines
two of the most common: (1) a defendant’s relative youth at the time of the
offense and (2) disparities in sentences between codefendants.
1. Where Youth and Codefendant Disparities Can Be Grounds for
Compassionate Release
a. Youth
At least three circuit courts—the Second, Fourth, and Tenth—have
indicated that a defendant’s relative youth at the time of an offense may
contribute to a finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances.188
District courts in a number of other circuits have reached the same
conclusion.189 Few courts, however, have addressed exactly how such a
factor should be considered.190 A recent decision from the Southern District
of New York offers perhaps the most in-depth analysis of how—and why—
an offender’s youth matters to the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry. In United States
v. Ramsay,191 Judge Jed S. Rakoff found that the defendant’s youth at the
time of the offense, in combination with other reasons, amounted to
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.192
In 1992, Andrew Ramsay, then seventeen years old, was convicted of
murdering two bystanders, one of whom was pregnant, at a Labor Day block
party.193 In Ramsay’s case, like many others, the then mandatory sentencing
scheme compelled Judge Rakoff to sentence Ramsay to life imprisonment
without considering Ramsay’s youth.194 However, in light of the Second
186. Logan, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 731.
187. See, e.g., id. at 740 (“[F]actors [that existed at sentencing] should generally be given
little weight when a judge decides whether to grant a compassionate-release request—
particularly when, as here, a different judge (one who was far more familiar with the defendant
and the case) imposed the sentence.”).
188. United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 837 (10th Cir. 2021) (affirming the district
court’s grant of compassionate release based on a combination of factors, including
“‘Maumau’s young age at the time of’ sentencing”); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271,
286 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he courts [below] focused on the defendants’ relative youth—from
19 to 24 years old—at the time of their offenses, a factor that many courts have found relevant
under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).”); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 2020)
(“Zullo’s age [, between 17 and 20,] at the time of his crime . . . might perhaps weigh in favor
of a sentence reduction.”).
189. See United States v. Ramsay, No. 96-cr-1098, 2021 WL 1877963, at *5 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
May 11, 2021) (collecting cases).
190. See id. at *5 (“[T]his Court is unaware of any prior case addressing how and why an
offender’s youth matters to the § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) inquiry.”).
191. No. 96-cr-1098, 2021 WL 1877963 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2021).
192. See id. at *1.
193. See id.
194. See id.
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Circuit’s conclusion that judges are now free to consider any extraordinary
and compelling circumstances for a sentence reduction,195 Judge Rakoff
posed the question: “Can an offender’s youth, combined with society’s
evolving understanding of the adolescent brain, constitute such a
circumstance?”196 He found that it could.197
Judge Rakoff began by citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent indicating
that the Eighth Amendment compels sentencing courts to consider offenders’
relative youth when determining whether especially severe sentences can and
should be imposed.198 Judge Rakoff then referred to a growing body of
research on the adolescent brain suggesting that youthful offenders possess
common characteristics of immaturity, salvageability, dependence, and
susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressures.199 Judge Rakoff
concluded by granting Ramsay’s motion for compassionate release, holding
that sentencing courts should consider an adolescent offender’s immaturity,
salvageability, dependency, and susceptibility when determining whether
extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist.200
b. Sentencing Disparities Between Codefendants
Federal courts have also determined that disparities between the sentences
of codefendants can support a finding of extraordinary and compelling
reasons for release. Take the case of James Edwards, who, in 2006, pled
guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine.201 Because he had previously been convicted of at least two prior
controlled substance offenses, Edwards was deemed a career offender under
the Sentencing Guidelines and sentenced to 292 months in prison.202 While
Edwards remained incarcerated, his principal coconspirator, Lester Fletcher,
who was originally sentenced to life imprisonment, was released to home
confinement despite engaging in “far more egregious conduct.”203 Based in
part on their sentence disparities, Edwards moved for compassionate
release. 204
In weighing Edwards’s motion, Judge Peter J. Messitte observed that
Fletcher’s significantly reduced sentence “resulted in a striking disparity
195. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that district
courts may consider “the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons that an imprisoned
person might bring before them”).
196. Ramsay, No. 96-cr-1098, 2021 WL 1877963, at *1.
197. Id.
198. See id. at *6–7. In several cases since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has held, based
on “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)),
that “[y]outh matters in sentencing,” Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (2021).
199. See Ramsay, No. 96-cr-1098, 2021 WL 1877963, at *7–13.
200. See id.
201. See United States v. Edwards, No. 05-179, 2021 WL 1575276, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 22,
2021).
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
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where a middling supplier of drugs is punished far more severely than the
violent ‘ringleader’ of a drug trafficking organization that dealt in far greater
amounts of drugs.”205 While the court acknowledged the government’s
concern that such an expansive reading of § 3582(c)(1)(A) could lead to a
“bottomless inventory of compassionate release motions,” it concluded that
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in McCoy had clearly instructed that courts are
free to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason that a defendant
might raise.206 Judge Messitte found that the disparity between the sentences
of Edwards and Fletcher was sufficiently extraordinary and compelling and
granted release. 207
Judge Messitte is not alone in reaching this conclusion. District judges in
other jurisdictions have similarly found that, based on the FSA’s changes to
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), disparities between codefendants’ sentences can qualify as
extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction.208 As such, it
appears that courts in multiple circuits have given district judges substantial
leeway to grant compassionate release based on circumstances that existed
when a defendant was initially sentenced.
2. Where Youth and Codefendant Disparities Cannot Be Grounds for
Compassionate Release
The positions described above, however, are by no means universally
accepted by the federal courts. The Sixth Circuit, for example, has expressly
prohibited district judges from considering youth and sentencing disparities
and has held that facts that existed when a defendant was sentenced cannot
later be construed as extraordinary and compelling.209 In United States v.
Hunter, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court had abused its discretion
by granting compassionate release based in part on the defendant’s young
age at the time of the offense and sentence disparities between the defendant
and his coconspirators.210 The Sixth Circuit panel began by reiterating that,
under the FSA, district courts have discretion to define “extraordinary and

205. Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Payton, No. 06-cr-341, 2021 WL 927631, at *2
(D. Md. Mar. 11, 2021)).
206. Id. (“[T]he Fourth Circuit has clearly instructed that ‘courts are “empowered . . . to
consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.”’”
(quoting United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020))).
207. See id. at *3.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Minicone, 521 F. Supp. 3d 163, 166–69 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)
(granting compassionate release to an elderly defendant whose sentence was out of step with
his codefendants’ sentences); United States v. Price, 496 F. Supp. 3d 83, 90 (D.D.C. 2020)
(granting compassionate release to a defendant who received a longer sentence than more
culpable codefendants and whose equally culpable peers in the conspiracy had all already
received compassionate release); United States v. Millan, No. 91-CR-685, 2020 WL 1674058,
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) (granting compassionate release based in part on sentence
disparities between a defendant and similarly situated codefendants).
209. See United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2021).
210. Id. at 560.
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compelling” on their own initiative.211 But, in considering youth and
codefendant disparities, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court had
simply gone too far.212 As the Sixth Circuit explained, § 3582(c)(1)(A)
precludes courts from “simply taking facts that existed at sentencing and
repackaging them as ‘extraordinary and compelling.’”213
The Sixth Circuit’s principal concern was that allowing courts to
reconsider facts that existed at the time of sentencing would nullify the
extraordinary and compelling requirement and transform § 3582(c)(1)(A)
into an “unbounded resentencing statute.”214 In order to avoid this, the court
explained that the extraordinary and compelling reasons inquiry must focus
only on post-sentencing factual developments.215 The Sixth Circuit also
cited policy concerns arising from allowing district courts to relabel facts that
existed at sentencing as “extraordinary and compelling.”216 The court first
emphasized the importance of finality in criminal sentencing.217 The Sixth
Circuit also criticized the district court’s reliance on scientific articles about
the development of the adolescent brain by asserting that “there will always
be a new academic article a defendant can marshal to recharacterize their
background and the facts of the offense.”218 The Sixth Circuit posited that
because there is no limit on the number of successive motions a defendant
can file under § 3582(c)(1)(A), permitting district courts to relitigate and
reweigh facts that existed at sentencing would render illusory the statute’s
general rule of finality.219 Finally, the Sixth Circuit indicated that giving
judges the power to second-guess old sentencing decisions is especially
problematic when the judge considering the compassionate release motion is
not the judge who originally sentenced the defendant.220
211. See id. at 562 (noting that “until Congress or the [Sentencing] Commission acts,
‘district courts have discretion to define “extraordinary and compelling” on their own
initiative’” (quoting United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519–20 (6th Cir. 2021))).
212. See id. (“[T]he mere fact that defining extraordinary and compelling ‘is left to the
district court’s discretion, with no heavy congressional thumb on either side of the scales, does
not mean that no legal standard governs that discretion . . . . “[A] motion to [a court’s]
discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be
guided by sound legal principles.”’” (second and third alterations in the original) (quoting
Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005))).
213. Id. at 569.
214. Id. at 570.
215. Id. at 569. According to the Hunter panel, the 1983 Senate Report seems to indicate
that Congress enacted § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow for compassionate release based on
developments that occurred after sentencing. See id. The Senate Report states that
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) “applies, regardless of the length of sentence, to the unusual case in which
the defendant’s circumstances are so changed, such as by terminal illness, that it would be
inequitable to continue the confinement of the prisoner.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at
121 (1983)).
216. See id. at 569.
217. See id. (stating that “[t]he problem with such an approach is that it renders the general
rule of finality and the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons requirement ‘superfluous, void
or insignificant’” (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009))).
218. Id. at 571.
219. See id.
220. See id. (criticizing the district court for granting compassionate release based on “a
mere difference of opinion” regarding the fairness of the sentence originally imposed).
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Legal scholar Paul J. Larkin, Jr. agrees with the Sixth Circuit’s view that
the FSA’s amendments should not be viewed as having created a broadscale
“second look” mechanism.221 According to Larkin, the text of section 603
clearly says that the BOP failed to adequately manage the compassionate
release process as Congress expected it would.222 However, that text does
not say that district courts are now “open for the business of resentencing
offenders and answering for themselves all the questions that [one] would
have expected Congress to answer” before taking such a radical step.223 As
Justice Antonin Scalia once stated, “Congress, we have held, does not alter
the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”224
III. RESOLVING CURRENT AND FUTURE DISAGREEMENTS THROUGH
GUIDED JUDICIAL DISCRETION
As described in Part I, most circuits225 have concluded that the Sentencing
Commission’s failure to update its policy statement to reflect the FSA’s
changes to § 3582(c)(1)(A) means that, presently, there is no “applicable”
policy statement governing defendant-initiated compassionate release
motions.226 As a result, the amorphous phrase “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” is presumably limited only by the statute’s plain
meaning and whatever an appellate court would consider an abuse of
discretion.227 Yet, as Parts II.B and II.C illustrate, circuit courts have
struggled at times to draw a clear line between acceptable exercises of
judicial authority and abuse of discretion.228
But these are not simple questions with simple answers. In each of the
cases described above, the courts engaged in nuanced, reasoned, and
principled decision-making. Occasionally, those courts reached very
different conclusions.229 These issues are exacerbated by the fact that similar
disagreements will almost certainly emerge in other contexts as courts
continue to face new compassionate release motions that raise novel
arguments. Given the vast legal complexities underlying these questions and
the highly individualized nature of every compassionate release request, this
Note does not attempt to directly resolve the debates discussed in Parts II.B
and II.C. Rather, this Note pursues a more fundamental question: what is

221. See Larkin, supra note 40, at 418 (claiming that it is “dubious in the extreme” that
Congress intended to sneak a second-look provision into a revision of the compassionate
release section of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
222. See id. at 417.
223. Id. at 418.
224. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
225. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring that any sentence reduction be “consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020).
228. See supra Parts II.B–C.
229. See supra Parts II.B–C.
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the best method for resolving these disagreements and similar disagreements
that will likely arise in the future?
A. The Short-Term Fix: Appellate Courts Should Embrace District Courts’
Broad Discretion to Grant Compassionate Release
Despite the underdeveloped doctrine governing compassionate release,
federal appellate courts should embrace the broad discretion that Congress
provided to district judges in the amended version of § 3582(c)(1)(A),230 and
the appellate courts should articulate a body of law that effectively promotes
both fairness and consistency. As an initial matter, the First, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits should join the majority position in holding that the
Sentencing Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement no longer binds district
courts considering defendant-filed motions for compassionate release.231
Simply recognizing that district judges may look beyond the reasons
enumerated in the pre-FSA policy statement, however, is not enough.
Appellate courts should also adopt a strong presumption against overturning
grants of compassionate release for abuse of discretion. Such an
interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A) is consistent with the statute’s text, purpose,
and legislative history.
First, in passing § 3582(c)(1)(A) as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Congress vested significant discretionary power within the district
courts.232
The statute empowered district courts to determine in
individualized cases whether “there is justification for reducing a term of
imprisonment.”233 Congress envisioned that § 3582(c)(1)(A) would act as a
“safety valve” for modifying sentences and intended for district courts to be
able to reduce sentences when justified by the various factors and reasoning
that the Parole Commission had previously considered in making parole
decisions.234 Congress further noted that such an approach would keep “the
sentencing power in the judiciary where it belongs” and that § 3582(c)(1)(A)
would allow for the “later review of sentences in particularly compelling
situations.”235 This legislative history demonstrates that Congress, in passing
the SRA, intended to give district courts an equitable power to correct
individual sentences when extraordinary and compelling circumstances
indicate that the original sentence no longer served legislative objectives.
Second, nothing in the text or legislative history of § 3582(c)(1)(A)
indicates that Congress intended to limit its application only to the types of
circumstances described in the Sentencing Commission’s outdated policy
statement. Rather, the statute provides that if a judge finds any extraordinary
230. See David Roper, Pandemic Compassionate Release and the Case for Improving
Judicial Discretion over Early Release Decisions, 33 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 31 (2020).
231. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
232. The statute expressly provides that a court may reduce a defendant’s sentence if “the
court . . . finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
233. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 56 (1983).
234. See id. at 121.
235. Id.
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and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction, those reasons could
form the legal basis for reducing “an unusually long sentence.”236 Indeed,
the legislative history of § 3582(c)(1)(A) indicates that lawmakers believed
that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard could encompass a
wide range of “circumstances.”237 In crafting the compassionate release
statute, Congress imposed only one limitation on district courts:
“Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an
extraordinary and compelling reason.”238 Given this broad mandate,
appellate courts should be hesitant to conclude that a district court judge has
abused judicial discretion by granting a sentence reduction based on novel or
largely unforeseeable circumstances.
Third, Congress’s explicit motivation for passing the FSA supports giving
district judges broad discretion in defining “extraordinary and compelling”
reasons. In amending § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow defendants to bring
compassionate release motions directly to their sentencing courts, Congress
sought to expand and expedite the compassionate release process by
empowering the courts to step in when the BOP fails to act.239 As many
courts have recognized, the FSA’s amendments to the compassionate release
statute were a direct response to the BOP’s decades-long mismanagement of
the compassionate release mechanism.240 Even the title of the FSA’s
compassionate release provision indicates Congress’s desire to expand and
democratize the compassionate release mechanism: “Increasing the Use and
Transparency of Compassionate Release.”241 As such, providing judges
broad discretion will best effectuate Congress’s goals in revising the
compassionate release statute.
Critics of this approach raise several concerns regarding broad judicial
discretion in defining “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for sentence
reductions. Fundamentally, critics claim that broader judicial discretion will
236. Id. at 55–56.
237. Id. (“The [Senate Judiciary] Committee believes that there may be unusual cases in
which an eventual reduction in the length of a term of imprisonment is justified by changed
circumstances. These would include cases of severe illness, cases in which other
extraordinary and compelling circumstances justify a reduction of an unusually long sentence,
and some cases in which the sentencing guidelines for the offense of which the defendant was
convicted have been later amended to provide a shorter term of imprisonment.” (emphasis
added)).
238. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (emphasis added).
239. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing how
Congress was motivated by the BOP’s failure to bring compassionate release motions to
sentencing courts when amending § 3582(c)(1)(A) in the FSA); OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
supra note 21, at 27–28 (providing data on the BOP’s failure to bring compassionate release
motions to sentencing courts); 164 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of
Sen. Ben Cardin) (asserting that that the FSA would “expand[] compassionate release” and
“expedite[] compassionate release applications”); 164 CONG. REC. H10362 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
2018) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) (noting that the FSA would “improv[e] application
of compassionate release”).
240. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text; see also OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
supra note 21, at 11 (summarizing the BOP’s underutilization of compassionate release).
241. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3582).
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give district judges unfettered power to invent their own policies regarding
compassionate release.242 But these concerns are not necessarily well
founded—while the FSA significantly expanded judicial discretion over
compassionate release decisions, Congress presumably did not intend for
district courts to make these decisions on a whim. Judicial discretion over
compassionate release after the FSA will likely be considerably different
from judicial discretion exercised before the SRA.
District judges, unlike the BOP and the Parole Commission, are subject to
appellate review and potential reversal by circuit courts.243 Judicial control
over compassionate release decisions also promotes transparency, as district
courts must explain their reasons for granting or denying each compassionate
release motion.244 Moreover, from a practical standpoint, district court
judges are presumably best situated to evaluate these requests:245 they are
likely most familiar with the facts of the case, they can hold hearings and
speak directly with prisoners,246 and they have extensive experience
considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.247 The reviewability and
transparency of compassionate release decisions under the FSA is thus a
significant improvement from the black-box decision-making of parole
boards and the BOP.248
Perhaps most importantly, the existence of extraordinary and compelling
reasons does not make compassionate release a guarantee. Even where a
defendant has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances, the
compassionate release statute still requires the court to undertake an analysis

242. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1257 (11th Cir.) (contending that
broad judicial discretion in defining “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances “would
return us to the pre-SRA world of disparity and uncertainty”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583
(2021) (mem.); Larkin, supra note 40, at 416–20 (arguing that the FSA liberalized
compassionate release by providing prisoners an additional method of review, not by
expanding judicial discretion via the catchall provision).
243. Ferraro, supra note 31, at 2508. Compare Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1181 (holding that
district court decisions on compassionate release are subject to appellate review), with Crowe
v. United States, 430 F. App’x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (stating that the BOP’s
failure to bring a compassionate release motion is not reviewable), and Zannino v. Arnold,
531 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting that the judiciary has limited discretion to review
decisions by parole boards).
244. See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1963 (2018) (requiring district
courts to adequately explain sentencing modification decisions); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgmt. Sys., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 (2014) (holding that appellate courts can correct
legal or factual errors made by district courts); Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132,
139 (2005) (“Discretion is not whim . . . .”).
245. Indeed, even the Sentencing Commission has acknowledged that district courts are
“in a unique position to assess whether the circumstances exist, and whether a reduction is
warranted.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, supp., amend. 799, at 136 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2016).
246. See Russell, supra note 92, at 81 (arguing that “[a]ppellate courts should recognize
that district court judges are better situated to evaluate requests for modification, and give
deference to those determinations”).
247. See Roper, supra note 230, at 32.
248. See supra note 243 and accompanying text; see also Ferraro, supra note 31, at
2508–09.
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of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.249 Indeed, district courts continue to
deny a vast majority of compassionate release petitions.250 In short, giving
judges broad authority to grant compassionate release is far from a
get-out-of-jail-free card for prisoners.
B. Looking Ahead: Lessons and Recommendations for the Sentencing
Commission
The trickier question is how to resolve disagreements among the various
courts of appeals. Given the current state of affairs, it is unlikely that
appellate courts will be able to reach a consensus on these questions anytime
soon. Similarly, the Supreme Court to date has shown little interest in wading
into the various existing compassionate release debates.251 It is possible that
Congress could seek to step in and resolve some of these debates,252 but this
would be a long and arduous process. Moreover, given the incalculable
number of extraordinary and compelling reasons defendants might raise,
federal courts will continue to grapple with similar types of issues going
forward. Likely, only the Sentencing Commission can permanently resolve
these conflicts.253
When the Sentencing Commission regains its quorum and issues an
updated policy statement consistent with the FSA, district courts will once
again be bound by the policy statement’s contents.254 In doing so, it is
essential that the Sentencing Commission avoid making the same mistakes it
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring that courts consider the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors before granting a sentence reduction).
250. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 38, at 4 tbl.1. Overall, 17.5 percent of
compassionate release motions were granted in 2020 and the first six months of 2021
combined. Id.
251. See, e.g., Jarvis v. United States, No. 21-568, 2022 WL 89314 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022)
(mem.) (denying petition for certiorari seeking to overturn the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Jarvis); Bryant v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021) (mem.) (denying
petition for certiorari seeking to overturn the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Bryant); cf. Longoria v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 978, 979 (2021) (statement of Sotomayor,
J., joined by Gorsuch, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (observing, with respect to another
Guidelines dispute, that the “Commission should have the opportunity to address [the] issue
in the first instance, once it regains a quorum of voting members”).
252. In March 2021, Senators Dick Durbin and Chuck Grassley, the lead sponsors of the
FSA, introduced the First Step Implementation Act of 2021, S. 1014, 117th Cong. (2021),
which aims to further implement the FSA and advance its goals. See Press Release, United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Durbin, Grassley Introduce Bipartisan Legislation
to Advance the First Step Act’s Goals (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
press/dem/releases/durbin-grassley-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-advance-the-firststep-acts-goals [https://perma.cc/JK48-EUKR]. Notably, the First Step Implementation Act
would allow courts to apply the FSA’s sentencing reform provisions to reduce sentences
imposed prior to the enactment of the FSA. See First Step Implementation Act, S. 1014, 117th
Cong. § 101 (2021).
253. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring that sentence reductions be consistent with
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements); 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (empowering the
Sentencing Commission to issue policy statements as needed, especially in response to new
legislation); see also Ferraro, supra note 31, at 2514.
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (stating that decisions to grant sentence reductions must be
consistent with applicable policy statements from the Sentencing Commission).
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has made in the past. As many courts have already begun granting
compassionate release for a broad range of extraordinary and compelling
circumstances, the Sentencing Commission can—and should—recognize
and respond to these developing trends. But how exactly should the
Sentencing Commission seek to accomplish this?
1. Solution 1: A National Standard
One option would be to simply expand the categories supporting
compassionate release that are enumerated in the policy statement. The
Sentencing Commission could take the position that its updated policy
statement should provide concrete guidance as to what qualifies—or doesn’t
qualify—as an extraordinary and compelling reason for sentence reduction.
Judge Charles Breyer, the only current member of the Sentencing
Commission, appears to support this type of solution.255 In a recent
interview, Breyer stated, “You need a national standard,” and added that the
absence of one “creates a vacuum and . . . creates uncertainty, and most
importantly . . . creates disparity.”256 A number of legal commentators have
likewise suggested expanding the list of criteria for compassionate release.257
To be sure, providing an exhaustive list of extraordinary and compelling
reasons might be helpful to judges deciding compassionate release petitions,
but it comes at a heavy cost. First, even with broadened categories, an
updated policy statement could never capture the full universe of
extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. And, while
the types of inconsistent outcomes described in Parts II.B and II.C ought to
be minimized, it is not clear that a purely statutory solution is the best option.
Certainly, the Sentencing Commission should avoid a “solution” that
discourages judges from weighing all the relevant circumstances or that leads
to consistently harsh outcomes that contravene Congress’s purposes for
passing the FSA.
Attempting to eliminate judicial disparities in
compassionate release outcomes by limiting judicial discretion would result
in across-the-board treatment of truly different defendants.258
Second, a national standard would be inconsistent with Congress’s desire
to keep compassionate release decision-making in the judiciary’s hands.259
A national standard risks removing judges from the decision-making process.
Unless a defendant’s circumstances fall within one of the specifically
enumerated categories outlined in the updated policy statement, a judge
would be prohibited from considering the circumstance as a basis for granting
255. See Tolan, supra note 30.
256. See id.
257. See, e.g., Ferraro, supra note 31, at 2510–12; Roper, supra note 230, at 32 (noting that
the Sentencing Commission could amend U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to expand the health-related
criteria for compassionate release and “expressly allow district courts to grant relief when a
prior sentence is grossly disproportionate to current sentencing standards or is clearly no
longer necessary to achieve the sentencing goals in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)”).
258. See Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law of Sentencing: Developing
Judicial Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 934–35 (1996).
259. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 56 (1983).
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a sentence reduction.
An updated policy statement that restricts
compassionate release to certain specifically enumerated situations—or one
that returns significant gatekeeping power back to the hands of the BOP—
would effectively put judges in the same position they were in prior to the
FSA’s passage.
2. Solution 2: Resolving Disparities Through Guided Judicial Discretion
But perhaps there is another option: one that emphasizes the importance
of judicial discretion in the compassionate release process, while seeking to
minimize disparate outcomes over time. Instead of cabining judicial
discretion by adopting a national standard, the Sentencing Commission could
encourage judges to rely on their experience, reasoned judgment, and
common sense.
This Note proposes a two-step solution to achieve this. First, the
Sentencing Commission should preserve the catchall “other reasons”
provision in any future policy statement but vest the power to define those
reasons in the hands of district court judges.260 Second, to help resolve
current and future disagreements regarding compassionate release motions,
the Sentencing Commission should create a depository of compassionate
release decisions, transcripts, and other useful information and make this
information available to judges and litigants. In other words, rather than
seeking to cabin district court discretion by prescribing an exhaustive list of
extraordinary and compelling reasons, the Sentencing Commission should
support the courts in their development of a “common law” of compassionate
release.
a. Preserving the Catchall Provision
For starters, the Sentencing Commission should seek to emphasize that
judicial discretion holds utmost importance in compassionate release
decisions. To achieve this, the Sentencing Commission should retain the
current policy statement’s catchall “other reasons” provision but amend it to
permit sentence reductions for any other extraordinary and compelling
reasons as determined by the court.261 Such an amendment would not only
be consistent with Congress’s desire to “keep[] the sentencing power in the
judiciary where it belongs”262 but would also allow for more transparent
construction of legal precedent.263 As federal district court judge Robert W.
260. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018) (allowing for sentence reductions for “Other Reasons . . . [a]s determined by the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons”).
261. See id.
262. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 121 (1983).
263. See Roper, supra note 230, at 32 (“Outcomes aside, decision making about
compassionate release benefits from the influence of the judiciary by allowing for more
transparent construction of precedent and limiting the perception that unseemly political
considerations are influencing these decision-making processes.”). But see Bryant S. Green,
Comment, As the Pendulum Swings: The Reformation of Compassionate Release to
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Sweet described: “A system of justice, and society generally, benefit greatly
when an identifiable and responsible party exercises discretion to fashion
sentences that are appropriate to individual defendants.”264 Accordingly, to
the extent the Sentencing Commission decides to include specific examples
of extraordinary and compelling reasons in its updated policy statement, it
should also make clear that any such list is nonexhaustive. By leaving space
for judicial discretion subject to deferential appellate review, the Sentencing
Commission can enable district judges to meaningfully address entirely
unforeseeable circumstances and novel issues.
b. A New Role for the Sentencing Commission
Some judges may need guidance in exercising reasoned judgment,
especially if the goal is to simultaneously minimize disparate outcomes and
promote consistency in sentencing. To promote uniformity, the Sentencing
Commission can create a depository of compassionate release decisions and
other useful information to help guide judges and foster the development of
a compassionate release “common law.”265 In this way, the Sentencing
Commission can play a central role in resolving current and future
disagreements among federal courts, such as those described in Part II, while
at the same time allowing compassionate release jurisprudence to develop
over time.
Such a system may not be as impracticable as it first sounds. Since
October 2020, the Sentencing Commission has collected court
documentation for all compassionate release motions, regardless of whether
the motions were granted or denied.266 But this standardized data does not
begin to capture the thinking that goes into a judge’s decision to grant or deny
a particular motion for compassionate release. Thus, the Sentencing
Commission should review transcripts and opinions in which district judges
Accommodate Changing Perceptions of Corrections, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 143–45 (2014)
(arguing that there are strong historical, policy, and separation of powers arguments in favor
of vesting a high degree of discretion over compassionate release in the executive branch).
264. Sweet et al., supra note 258, at 934.
265. Legal commentators have argued that developing a common law of sentencing
through published opinions and data regarding sentencing decisions is a better way to cabin
judicial discretion than mandatory guidelines from the Sentencing Commission. See, e.g.,
Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 280 (2009)
(contending that “[w]ider use and availability of formal sentencing opinions is . . . critical to
developing a common law of sentencing and to cabining discretion”); Green, supra note 42,
at 57–58 (suggesting that the Sentencing Commission create an “electronic repository of
sentencing wisdom” by collecting and disseminating sentencing decisions in white collar
criminal cases); Russell, supra note 92, at 81 (recommending that the Sentencing Commission
“support district courts in their development of common law standards” for compassionate
release); Sweet et al., supra note 258, at 928 (arguing that “[a] return to a guided form of
judicial sentencing, relying on common law principles and modern technology, would result
in a more just and individualized form of sentencing”).
266. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 38, at 3. Prior to October 1, 2020, courts
submitted to the Sentencing Commission documentation regarding motions for all
compassionate release that were granted, but not for all compassionate release motions that
were denied. Id.
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explain their decisions more extensively, analyze the judge’s reasoning, and
make exemplary opinions and other materials available for judges, lawyers,
and defendants to use in connection with future compassionate release
motions.267 The goal is not to intimidate judges by subjecting their decisions
to greater scrutiny but rather to collect reasoned opinions to serve as
precedents for their peers.268
By continuously monitoring compassionate release decisions from across
the country, the Sentencing Commission can use its expertise to generate
valuable and accurate data, particularly insofar as consensus emerges.
Similarly, the Sentencing Commission can keep a close watch on developing
disparities on important issues impacting large categories of defendants. For
example, the Sentencing Commission could update its policy statement to
specifically allow sentence reductions in light of nonretroactive changes to
sentencing laws. This would allow the Sentencing Commission to help
resolve disagreements among appellate courts without constraining judicial
discretion. More importantly, however, making judicial decisions and other
data more widely accessible would help to foster the development of a
“common law” of compassionate release, thereby promoting greater fairness
and consistency across the system.
CONCLUSION
For the past thirty years, statutory and bureaucratic roadblocks have made
compassionate release an unlikely avenue for prisoners to receive sentence
reductions. Once a sentence was imposed, it was virtually impossible to get
it reduced. At the same time, sentencing laws often tied the hands of judges
and forced them to impose punishments that were vastly disproportionate to
the crimes. With the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, however, a crack
has emerged in the façade of federal sentencing laws. Under the revised
compassionate release statute, district courts are increasingly asserting the
authority to look back at old cases and reduce some of the most egregious
and unfair sentences.
Yet, appellate courts have struggled at times to define and apply the
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard consistently. Once the
Sentencing Commission regains its quorum and issues an updated policy
statement consistent with the FSA, the updated policy statement will once
again become fully binding on federal courts. In doing so, it is essential that
the Sentencing Commission avoid making the same mistakes it has made in
the past. Instead of rolling back judicial discretion, the Sentencing
Commission should help federal judges make better discretionary decisions.
By encouraging a form of guided judicial discretion, the Sentencing
Commission can achieve compassionate release decisions that are more

267. For a similar proposal in the context of reducing sentencing disparities in white-collar
criminal sentencing under the advisory guidelines scheme, see Green, supra note 42, at 58.
268. See id.
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reasoned, more transparent, more persuasive, more effective, and more
just.269

269. See Gertner, supra note 265, at 262.

